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“Tricking the Sails” of Post-World War One Public 
Opinion: John Maynard Keynes and The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace
Daniel J. Knickrehm
Univ. of Iowa
 
The Economic Consequences of the Peace  has a claim to be regarded as 
Keynes’s best book. In none of his others did he succeed so well in bringing all his 
gifts to bear on the subject in hand. Although the heart of the book was a lucid 
account of the reparation problem, the book was no mere technical treatise. [i]
 
Thinking about John Maynard Keynes in terms of the trickster reveals the 
strength behind his influence in 20th century international relations and economics. 
While for a large portion of his life he was not in a position to affect direct change in 
British policy, his role as author, advisor and educator gave Keynes a significant 
indirect influence on public opinion as well as governmental policy. There can be 
little doubt that Keynes’ polemic Economic Consequences of the Peace[ii] carried a 
serious and dire message to the people of war-torn Europe that the Treaty of 
Versailles held little hope for lasting European peace. However, a common 
perception of Keynes as stoic intellectual might overlook a playful yet powerful 
rhetoric present in his writing. Keynes’ literary approach to the problems presented 
by the Great War and its aftermath lent greater force to his message. As an example 
of Keynes’ literary trickery the following essay takes a brief look at his treatment of 
British Prime Minister Lloyd George within a context of The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace and immediate post-WWI British public opinion.
In 1919, less than one year after the Armistice was signed ending hostilities in
World War One, John Maynard Keynes was the chief British representative on the 
Supreme Economic Council during the talks preceding the signing of the Treaty of 
Versailles. Keynes had enormous authority to deal with economic elements of the 
treaty on behalf of the British Prime Minister. However, when Keynes realized that 
his efforts to guide the formation of economic policies were for various reasons 
ineffective he resigned his position in the British government and returned to 
England. In his Life of John Maynard Keynes, Roy Harrod wrote that “Keynes felt a 
personal obligation…to do something at once towards rectifying the situation.”[iii] 
Harrod also wrote that: “It was deep anguish of soul that urged him to write [The 
Economic Consequences of the Peace]…He did not hesitate to flout the mighty and 
to outrage prevailing opinion. He sought to change that opinion.”[iv] Keynes, a 
Cambridge economist and prominent member of the Bloomsbury Group, wrote his 
account of events taking place at the Paris Peace Conference and in December 1919, 
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The Economic Consequences of the Peace was published.
Keynes faced a difficult task. Not only did he have to counter an economic 
element in prevailing British public opinion that Germany could pay the full cost of 
the war, he had to overcome a moral element in the rhetoric supporting Prime 
Minister Lloyd George’s mandate. Since his direct attempts to steer the formation of 
the Treaty of Versailles toward what he felt were reasonable demands had failed, 
Keynes chose a more indirect method; he tried to take the wind out of the Treaty’s 
potential success by “tricking the sails” of public opinion that gave Lloyd George and 
his government a popular mandate. In Stracheyesque style Keynes attacked Lloyd 
George, the embodiment of British public opinion, to focus British moral outrage 
away from the Kaiser. In this way Keynes could trick the British public into changing
their stance on the economic issues of the Treaty without directly attacking the moral
element in post-war British public opinion.
To understand Keynes’ approach to this issue it is important to understand 
where public opinion and politics stood at the end of the Great War. The end of WWI
in November of 1918 brought to British Prime Minister Lloyd George’s coalition 
government of a level of insecurity. Although they had been the government that 
won the war, Lloyd George felt that attacks from both the political left and right 
might weaken his coalition government. In an effort to preserve political unity he 
called for a general election hoping that the government’s success at bringing about 
an end to the war would help carry it through an election. Lloyd George wanted a 
public mandate when he went to the Paris Peace Conference and he reflected on the 
need for such a mandate in his memoirs.  “Should hostilities suddenly terminate, it 
would be necessary to consult the country as to the line to be taken in making 
peace.”[v] By having an election immediately after declaration of the armistice Lloyd
George could take advantage of public sentiment and receive that mandate.
            One of the key elements in the election of 1918 was the recent change in 
composition of the enfranchised public. The British Reform Bill passed in early 1918
altered the composition of the voting public in such a way that candidates seeking 
election had to face the issue of indemnities from Germany. Huge numbers of male 
soldiers and sailors serving overseas were given the opportunity to vote, women were
partially enfranchised both directly, because some women gained the right to vote for
themselves, and indirectly since some gained the right to vote for their husbands 
through the proxy vote. Parents and other relatives were also allowed to serve as 
proxies for soldiers and sailors. All these people were exposed to wartime moral 
rhetoric supporting the increases in pensions and disability benefits for soldiers 
through the newspapers and other means. The resulting influence of so many people 
concerned for the future welfare of the soldiers, their families and the resultant burden
on the taxpayers, meant that in order to get elected and proceed to the formation of 
the Treaty of Versailles, Lloyd George had to adopt a campaign platform that 
demanded indemnities for the total cost of the war from Germany. To gain a public 
mandate for his policies at the peace conferences in Paris Lloyd George and others 
desiring to be elected had to work within a moral context to get elected. The build-up
of public sentiment toward the plight of returning soldiers forced potential MPs to 
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take a moral stance that was directly connected to reparation economics. It is unlikely 
that had anyone else been elected and named Prime Minister they would have been 
able to do so without conceding to public demands for the total costs of the war. In 
any case, public sentiment for soldiers, sailors and their families developed over the 
period from 1916 to 1918 and held sway in the election and subsequently, through 
the elected government, at the Paris Peace Conference.
In printed speeches the London Times provided evidence that Lloyd George 
was responding to public opinion rather than what might have been his own 
misguided beliefs. Over the course of a few weeks Lloyd George’s campaign rhetoric 
changed dramatically to account for demands of full indemnities. John Maynard 
Keynes outlined this change in The Economic Consequences of the Peace. “In his 
speech at Wolverhampton on the eve of the Dissolution (November 24) there is no 
word of Reparation or Indemnity…But a few days later at Newcastle (November 29) 
the Prime Minister was warming to his work: “When Germany defeated France she 
made France pay. That is the principle which she herself has established…and that is 
the principle we should proceed upon—that Germany must pay the costs of the war 
up to the limit of her capacity to do so.”[vi] These statements however, were still too 
vague for a British public who wanted Germany to pay for the total costs of the war. 
The people wanted more concrete assurances that Germany would be held fully 
accountable. Even in the early part of December 1918, Lloyd George had still not 
said enough to gain public support. On December 8, the London Times wrote that 
“The public mind was still bewildered by the Prime Minister’s various 
statements.”[vii] Lloyd George had a vague approach to the issue of reparations 
which meant that, according to the Times, he was at risk of losing public support. “It 
is the candidate who deals with the issues of to-day who adopts Mr. Barnes’s phrase 
about ‘hanging the Kaiser’ and plumps for the payment of the cost of the war by 
Germany, who rouses his audience and strikes the notes to which they are most 
responsive.”[viii] Three days later the Prime Minister issued a manifesto of six points 
that outlined his changed political stance on the issue of reparation.
      1.      Trial of the Kaiser.
2.      Punishment of those responsible for atrocities.
3.      Fullest indemnities from Germany.
4.      Britain for the British, socially and industrially.
5.      Rehabilitation of those broken in the war.
6.      A happier country for all.[ix]
Expanding on these issues later in the day at Bristol, Lloyd George outlined three 
principles that would guide his indemnity policy. “First, we have an absolute right to 
demand the whole cost of the war; second, we propose to demand the whole cost of 
the war; and third, a Committee appointed by direction of the Cabinet believe that it 
can be done.”[x] Thus it was that, at least according to Keynes, “The ordinary voter 
was led to believe that Germany could certainly be made to pay the greater part, if no
the whole cost of the war. Those whose practical and selfish fears for the future the 
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expenses of the war had aroused, and those whose emotions its horrors had 
disordered, were both provided for. A vote for a Coalition candidate meant the 
Crucifixion of Anti-Christ and the assumption by Germany of the British National 
Debt.”[xi] Four days later Lloyd George’s coalition government won the election. 
Although one may fault him for playing to the crowd, Lloyd George was merely 
responding to a sentiment that was already developed in the British public. The 
existence of such sentiment at the end of the war meant members of the peace 
commission that worked on the Treaty had their hands tied. One of the primary U.S. 
delegates to the Paris conference, Colonel House said that “By arousing popular 
emotion during the war, an orthodox belligerent measure, they had created a 
Frankenstein monster which now held them helpless.”[xii]
To undermine British confidence in the Treaty Keynes developed an intricate 
relationship between the three major negotiators, Lloyd George, French Prime 
Minister Clemenceau and American President Wilson. Keynes portrayed 
Clemenceau as the French embodiment of revenge for German aggressions in the 
Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871. Keynes portrayed President Wilson as politically 
inept yet a prophet of a new age in international relations. Keynes used Lloyd 
George’s actions to set him up as a devious, opportunistic villain who took advantage
of President Wilson and swayed him away from a morally righteous position to the 
side of Clemenceau’s immoral revenge. Keynes illustrated how Lloyd George 
“bamboozled” President Wilson into accepting Clemenceau’s point of view and how 
he subsequently, toward the end of the conference, tried to change Wilson’s mind 
and found out that “it was harder to de-bamboozle this old Presbyterian than it had 
been to bamboozle him…”[xiii] By establishing these relationships Keynes provided 
the British public with a way to change their political position without necessarily 
seeming to be immoral with respect to making the Kaiser pay or inconsiderate of 
veterans’ needs. The turnabout in Lloyd George’s position concerning indemnities 
reinforced Keynes’s suggestion that the Prime Minister’s political maneuvering was 
devious and underhanded. Keynes could bring about public indignation for Lloyd 
George’s actions by setting him up as an immoral opportunist and switch British 
public focus from a desire to support their veterans to the need to avoid being 
collectively vilified in the world political arena through a connection with Lloyd 
George. This rhetorical strategy meant that Keynes was trying to get the British 
public to disown the embodiment of their own political will and thus make ineffectua
the economic elements of the treaty they had staunchly demanded in 1918.
Although judging Keynes’ direct influence on the British public would 
involve a much more detailed study than is possible in a short article, one might hint 
at a potential influence on public opinion by establishing the popularity of the book. 
Public response to The Economic Consequences of the Peace was astounding. An 
international best seller, the book sold 60,000 copies in the first two months, 100,000
copies in the first six months and was translated into fourteen languages. Using 
critical reviews to gauge intellectual responses presents a most striking observation; 
virtually all reviews mentioned the biographical sketches that Keynes used to attack 
public opinion and some reviews attributed the book’s popularity directly to these 
sketches. Clyde King of the University of Pennsylvania wrote that The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace “has attracted world-wide attention because of its 
Page 4
4
Trickster's Way, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/trickstersway/vol2/iss2/3
Trickster's Way Vol 2
analysis of Germany’s ability to pay and because of its descriptions of the main 
features and the main actors in the world’s greatest drama: the Peace 
Conference.”[xiv] Another reviewer expressed a suspicion that “the popularity of his 
book is due less to his somber picture of the economic condition of Europe in 1919 or
serious discussion of remedial measures than to the agreeably acid and pointedly 
intimate portraits…”[xv] Charles Seymour wrote that “it is the chapter on “The 
Conference,” with its vivid and largely imaginative characterization of the Council of
Four, which has caught the attention of the public and chiefly accounts for the wide 
sale of the book.”[xvi] Other reactions attested to the potentially long-standing 
influence of the biographical sketches. “Mr. Keynes’ picture of the Four in action will 
not be forgotten so long as the Congress of Paris is remembered.”[xvii] An article in 
The World Tomorrow added that “History, we believe, will accept as authoritative 
Mr. Keynes’ brilliant picture of the Peace Conference and the leading actors in 
it.”[xviii] Probably the most positive review was recorded in The Bookman:
Non–financial and non-economic readers are finding their chief 
pleasure in the amazingly outspoken portraits of the so-called “Big 
Four”, and these, if vitriolic, have a brilliance than not many men 
could out-do.
Few writers could have bettered the portraits of President 
Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau. They have all the sharpness 
of the brilliant sketch, and, what is more, a suggestive quality which 
enables even those who have not been at all behind the scenes, to 
visualize the men who took part in the conference. I speak here 
entirely as a professional writer, and not at all as a politician. [xix]
Although these reviews do not suggest Keynes’ success at developing a direct 
influence upon public opinion they do establish the potential for such influence. This 
potential is further strengthened if one considers the expanding British middle class 
and increased political role of women; precisely the people who would be most 
effected by the terms of the Treaty. Success in averting future war would, as Keynes 
pointed out, mean more secure and prolific international trade and a reduced need for
men to leave their homes and die in battle. Perhaps, for this venue, the results of 
Keynes’ efforts are less significant than his method. What this brief look at The 
Economic Consequences of the Peace and the resulting reviews illustrates is that 
Keynes used narrative methods (the caricatures primarily) in his attempt to bring 
about international political and economic change. Since it was obvious to him that 
he could neither steer the juggernaut of Europe’s economic will himself nor suggest a 
different way to navigate the swells of international political rivalry, Keynes the 
trickster chose to “trick the sails” of public opinion in his attempt to bring peace to 
Europe.
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